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THE MASTER'S TOOLS: DECONSTRUCTING THE
SOCRATIC METHOD AND ITS DISPARATE IMPACT ON
WOMEN THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION DOCTRINE
TANISHA MAKEBA BAILEY *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article attempts to construct arguments that will expose
the Socratic Method's disparate impact upon women law students, and
lay a path to constitutional redress under the equal protection doctrine.
This will be done in three steps. Firstly, this article will examine the
historical pattern of discrimination against women in American law
schools for the past one hundred and thirty years. Secondly, through
the presentation of both testimonial and statistical evidence of the
disparity in classroom experience, grades, and grade-based
opportunities, an enhanced view of the severity of the discrimination
women face will emerge. Finally, I argue that the disparity itself will
substantiate an equal protection claim against this pedagogical practice
in many state-funded universities. This article will demonstrate the
need for constitutional scrutiny, which will ultimately serve to
eliminate this final, sexist vestige from the body of the American legal
education system.
In constructing this argument, I am reminded of the words of
womanistt writer Audre Lorde, who wrote:
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, 2003. I would like to thank
Professor Barbara Bezdek who inspired me two years ago to "add [my] voice to the legal
landscape." Her call for creativity in legal thinking inspired this article. 1 would also like to
thank Dr. Heather Neff for her unwavering friendship and support that has guided me
throughout my life and especially this journey through law school. Finally, I would like to
thank Mr. and Mrs. Bernadin Bailey and the members of my family for their ever-constant
love, belief, and support.
1. Alice Walker defines Womanist as:
Womanist 1. From womanish. (Opp. of "girlish," i.e., frivolous,
irresponsible, not serious.) A black feminist or feminist of color. From the
black folk expression of mothers to female children, 'You acting
womanish,' i.e., like a woman... 2. Also: A woman who loves other
women, sexually and /or nonsexually. Appreciates and prefers women's
culture, women's emotional flexibility (values tears as natural
counterbalance of laughter), and women's strength. Sometimes loves
individual men, sexually and/or nonsexually. Committed to survival and
wholeness of entire people, male and female. Not a separatist, except
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[S]urvival is not an academic skill. It is learning how to
stand alone, unpopular and sometimes reviled, and how
to make common cause with those others identified as
outside the structures in order to define and seek a
world in which we can all flourish. It is learning how
to take our differences and make them strengths. For
the master's tools will never dismantle the master's
house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at
his own game, but they will never enable us to bring
about genuine change.2
Herein, Lorde disputes the possibility of using the tools created
by white male oppression 3 to dismantle its extended manifestations of
sexism and racism.4 Lorde proposes that in order for effective change
to take place, all vestiges of oppression must be dismantled.5 She
argues that true change cannot be acquired through the very
constructions of oppression that characterize the paradigm. Lorde
thereby illustrates the impossibility of building a completely new
structure, when it is rooted upon the antiquated foundations of the
past.6
This analysis can be applied to the Socratic Method in legal
pedagogy. The use of this patriarchal teaching strategy as a means of
adequately conveying information to the female legal mind becomes
periodically, for health. Traditionally universalist... 4. Womanist is to
feminist as purple to lavender.
DEIRDRE MULLANE, CROSSING DANGEROUS WATER: THREE HUNDRED YEARS OF
AFRICAN-AMERICAN WRITING 722 (Deirdre Mullane ed., 1993) (quoting excerpts from ALICE
WALKER, IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHER'S GARDENS: WOMANIST PROSE (Harvest Books 1984)).
2. AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 112 (Nancy K. Bereano,
ed., The Crossing Press 2000) (1984).
3. Lorde describes the concept of white male oppression, as follows:
Somewhere on the edge of consciousness, there is what I call a mythical
norm, which each one of us within our hearts knows 'that is not me.' In
America, this norm is usually defined as white, thin, male, young,
heterosexual, Christian, and financially secure. It is with this mythical
norm that the trappings of power reside within this society.
Id. at 116.
4. Id. at 113. Lorde proffers that the manifestations of patriarchy and oppression
include for example racism, sexism, homophobia, classism. She argued against its appearance
in the realm of "white feminism," and describes the manifestation of any form of patriarchy
within the feminist realm as, "a diversion of energies and a tragic repetition of racist
patriarchal thought." Id.
5. Id. at 110.
6. Id. at 110-11 (questioning, "What does it mean when the tools of a racist patriarchy
are used to examine the fruits of that same patriarchy? It means that only the most narrow
perimeters of change are possible and allowable.").
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oxymoronic. The use of the Socratic Method creates two issues:
whether such a strategy can be effective when it was crafted during a
time when women were not allowed to study in American law schools,
and whether a system based on exclusion and inequality 7 can be
expected to reap academic excellence in those very students it
excluded.
Lorde's paradigm provides a scope through which these issues
may be viewed, and resolved in the negative. Implementing male-
constructed and male-centered teaching tools8 in an attempt to educate
the feminine legal mind handicaps the female student and creates an
environment where women's academic excellence is severely
impaired.
Used as a teaching methodology for over a century in
American law schools, the Socratic Method has stripped thousands of
women of equal treatment and equal opportunity to education. 9 While
its promoters contend the Method is intended to empower all law
students with the knowledge of the law, I argue that this teaching
strategy is built upon fear, humiliation, and intimidation. It hinders the
academic development of women by maintaining a denigrating
psychological atmosphere of silence, and adversarial competition.
Taken together, these factors place female law students at a
disadvantage to their male counterparts.
This article will expand the dialogue on the impact of the
Socratic Method on women law students, through the application of
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection doctrine. 10 In so doing,
it will develop an argument refuting the propriety of the Socratic
Method's use as a form of hegemonic pedagogy. The Socratic Method
is an inefficient teaching strategy with devastating aggregate effects
upon women law students.1' Therefore, in the spirit of Audre Lorde's
paradigm of the Master's Tools, I argue that it is impossible to be
academically constructive on a platform that is intellectually
destructive to half of those it means to educate. ' 2
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part 11.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. American Bar Association, Division of Legal Education, at
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/femstats.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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II. HISTORY OF WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION
The historical interaction between law schools and women has
been an exclusionary one, laced with over a hundred years of
denigration and marginalization. The first woman on record to receive
a law degree in the United States was Ada Kepley from Union College
of Law in Illinois (Northwestern) in 1870.1 The following quote
exemplifies the sentiment toward women participating in the law, as
expressed by the Court of Common Pleas of Hennepin County,
Minnesota in 1876:
Women train and educate the young, which forbids that
they shall bestow that time and (early and late) labor, so
essential in attaining the eminence to which the true
lawyer should ever aspire. It cannot therefore be said
that the opposition of courts to the admission of females
to practice ... is to any extent the outgrowth of ... old
fogyism .... It arises rather from a comprehension of
the magnitude of the responsibilities connected with the
successful practice of law, and a desire to grade up the
profession.4
Or similarly the words of Supreme Court Justice Joseph Bradley:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always
recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres
and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be,
woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life .... The paramount destiny
and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother.
15
Sentiments like this pervaded the male-dominated legal
community in regards to women's access to legal education and
13. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO
THE 1980s (The University of North Carolina Press Chapel 1983) (tracing the general history
of American law schools and its pedagogy).
14. United States v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 543 (1996) (quoting the Court of Common Pleas
of Hennepin County, Minn.) [hereinafter VM/].
15. Bradwell v. Ill., 83 U.S. 130, 131 (1873).
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practice during the nineteenth and early portions of the twentieth
century. 
16
Another example could be seen in a 1925 report on Columbia
University that explained its resistance to enrolling women law
students because, "If women were admitted to the Columbia Law
School, [the faculty] said, then the choicer, more manly and red-
blooded graduates of our great universities would go to the Harvard
Law School!'17 This quote epitomizes the sexist exclusion of women
from early legal institutions. Consider also that many of the nation's
Ivy League colleges did not admit women until well into the middle of
the twentieth century. 18 As one Yale alumnus stated, "In theory I am
in favor of [women] studying law and practicing law, provided they
are ugly."' 9  These excerpts typify the resistance that women
encountered in their early quest for law school admission and
participation. It is in this atmosphere of exclusion and animus that the
Socratic Method was born.20
III. DEFINITION: WHAT IS THE SOCRATIC METHOD?
In order to dismantle the Socratic Method, it is first important
to construct a working definition of this methodology. Denotatively,
the term Socratic means "of Socrates or his method of trying to arrive
at the truth by asking questions.",21 This definition refers to the ancient
Greek philosopher Socrates who lived from 469-399 B.C.E.22
Socrates' philosophy extolled the idea of moral primacy 23 and the
16. CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 49 (Anchor Books 1981) (1983) (stating,
"Women were notably absent from American legal education for its first one hundred years.").
17. VMI, 518 U.S. at 543-44 (referencing the remarks of the administration at Columbia
in the early 1900's.).
18. STEVENS, supra note 13, at 84.
19. Id. at 83.
20. See infra Part II. See also STEVENS, supra note 13, at 83 (stating that Langdell
himself opposed the admission of women).
21. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 775 (3d ed. 1994).
22. PLATO, THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES 8 (Hugh Tredennick trans., Penguin Books
1969) (1954).
23. Socrates was committed to the primacy of the soul or character in living
the best human life. Knowledge was central to that commitment, and
hence philosophy, as the quest for moral knowledge, was also
fundamental. Moreover, Socrates was convinced that the best character
and knowledge were closely tied to right conduct, and that harmful or
unjust action was self-destructive.
CLASSICS OF MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 1-2 (Michael L. Morgan ed., Hackett
Publishing Company 1992).
2003
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24
commitment to knowledge as an integral part of moral goodness. In
order to excavate the knowledge within each person, he employed a
strategy of questioning that would lead the student to his own
answer.
This strategy was later adopted and extended by Harvard
Professor and Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell in 1870.26
Langdell's implementation of the Socratic Method in its new legal
27incarnation is described as a cooperative system of learning. In this
model, Langdell explored with his students the underlying rules of the
cases that his students were required to prepare for that day's lesson.
28
The lesson began with one student reciting the facts and the law of the
case. 29  Langdell's strategic questioning was designed to both elicit
and stimulate responses from the class. 30  The students and the
professor engaged in a verbal dialogue from which a complete
understanding of the cases and their governing principles would
arise.3
1
This method of case study and skillful questioning changed
dramatically in its one hundred and thirty year evolution and it bears
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id. at 9. Socrates implemented the technique of question and answering. He
believed that his role as teacher was not to give the answer but to bring it out of his pupil
through the skill of questioning. "He frequently insisted that he is not a teacher: that he
merely possesses an intellectual skill . . . which enables him to help others to bring their
thoughts to the birth." Id.
26. Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law By Design: How Learning Theory and
Instructional Design Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 347, 349-
350 (2001).
27. Langdell began his actual teaching by having each of the cases, which the
students had to study carefully in preparation for the class, briefly
analyzed by one of them with respect to the facts and the law contained in
it. He then added a series of questions, which were so arranged as
gradually to lay bare the entire law contained in that particular case. This
stimulated questions, doubts, and objections on the part of the individual
students, against whom the teacher had to hold his ground in reply.
Teacher and pupils then, according to Langdell's design, work together
unremittingly to extract from the single cases and from the combination or
contrasting of cases their entire legal content, so that in the end those
principles of that particular branch of the law which control the entire
mass of related cases are made clear.
David D. Garner, Socratic Misogyny? - Analyzing Feminist Criticisms of Socratic
Teaching in Legal Education, 2000 BYU L. REv. 1597, 1599 (2000) (arguing for reform in the
use of the Socratic Method in legal education) (citing JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND
THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS 12 (1914)).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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slight resemblance to its classical beginnings.32 Today, the Socratic
Method is the leading form of pedagogy in legal education.33 Yet,
modem instruction is less cooperative-based than Langdell's original
model. It now resembles a masochistic interplay of domineering, and
at times evasive, professors attempting to inform humiliated, and
silenced students.3  As David Garner comically, yet accurately,
describes, "[T]he Socratic method has often been described in terms of
'Socratic kung fu.' Advocates of the method .. .tout the Socratic
method as a form of 'ritualized combat,' a 'civilized battle,' a 'boot
camp' of sorts, in which professors utterly 'destroy' students by
making 'friendly assault[s]' on their answers." 35  This description
highlights the brutal manner in which law professors interrogate their
students, and the debilitating effects of this humiliating tactic. What
this caricature fails to adequately convey is the gravity of this effect on
women law students. As will be demonstrated, the Socratic Method
impairs the ability of women law students to perform and excel
academically, leading to a crippling of their long-term performance in
terms of grade-based opportunities.
IV. EVIDENCE: GENDER AND DISPARITY
The adverse impact of the Socratic Method on female students
exists in startling contrast to the impact on their male counterparts. In
comparison to male law students, female law students report greater
deficiencies in areas ranging from lower levels of class participation 36
and confidence, 37 to overall mental states and depression. 3 8  In
addition, there exists a further anomalous relationship between female
students entering law school. Women achieve higher grade point
averages than men before entering law school, but receive lower
32. See id. at 1600-01. Garner describes the current structure of the Socratic Method as
follows:
[T]he modem Socratic dialogue resembles a game of 'hide the ball' in
which the professor asks questions that he knows the answers to while his
students do not. The object of the game is to produce the answer that the
professor thinks is correct. If the student fails to answer correctly,
personal humiliation follows in various forms.
Id.
33. Schwartz, supra note 26, at 349-50.
34. Garner, supra note 27, at 1601.
35. Id.
36. See infra Part IV A-B.
37. See infra Part IV A-B.
38. See infra Part IV A-B.
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academic scores upon completing law school.39' Through testimonial
excerpts from a variety of sources, women's experiences in legal
education will be catalogued. The testimony enhances and
personalizes the argument against the oppressive atmosphere created
by the endemic sexism pervasive throughout legal education, as
proffered by the Socratic Method.4 °
A. Testimony: Silenced by the Socratic Method
In 1970, Alice D. Jacobs conducted one of the first studies on
the treatment of women in law schools, surveying both men and
women law students at two universities. 41 She found that, although
men and women performed academically identically in both their
undergraduate and law courses, women participated less than men.42
While this early study did not explicitly measure the role of the
Socratic Method on women's silencing, similar findings would later be
directly linked to the Method's effects with more detrimental
outcomes revealed than those found by Jacob.
In 1988-89, a study at Berkeley Law School concluded that the
Socratic Method adversely affected women.43  The Berkeley study
found statistical evidence of the silencing of women and concluded
that professors used the Socratic Method as a means of forced
participation and humiliation." In many recent studies, the most
commonly reported result of the Socratic Method is the comparatively
lower level of classroom participation on the part of women law
39. Richard K. Neumann, Women in Legal Education: What the Statistics Show, 50 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 313, 320-21 (2000). Neumann found that in the academic year 1997-1998,
women entering law school held an undergraduate GPA (UGPA) of 3.16 compared to male
law students who earned an average G.P.A. of 3.06. Id. at 320 tbl.6. "In each of these years
[1993-98] the average female UGPA was 0.09 or 0.10 of a grade point higher than the male
average." Id. at 320. He stated that, "While 53.9 percent of men earned first-year grades at or
above the mean at their school.., only 50.6 of women earned comparable standing .... ). Id.
at 321.
40. The use of narrative voice in legal scholarship is a tool used to personalize and
deconstruct hegemonic tools. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 971 (1991); Daniel A. Faber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay
on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993).
41. Alice D. Jacobs, Women in Law School: Structural Constraint and Personal Choice
in the Formation of Professional Identity, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 462 (1970).
42. Id. at 470 (stating, "[Allthough women perform very well academically, it was
observed that they consistently interact less frequently than men in the classroom. They
volunteer or are chosen to answer questions much less frequently than men.").
43. Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an
Inside Look at Law School, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 24-25 (1990).
44. Id. at 37-38.
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students.45 This phenomenon has been attributed to several sources
within the legal pedagogy, including the use of the Socratic Method
and the adversarial atmosphere it fosters within the classroom.46
In her groundbreaking book Becoming Gentlemen, Harvard
Professor Lani Guinier chronicles the effects of this male oriented
structure at the University of Pennsylvania.47 Guinier explores the
effects of this inherently sexist institution on the total welfare of
women engaged in the pursuit of the law. As she explains:
In training students to think of the process of asking and
answering questions as an opportunity to put someone
on the spot to demonstrate how little that person knows,
or to identify important hidden assumptions,
conversation is valued for its adversarial style .... To
the extent this occurs, the technique of Socratic
teaching . . . looks to many women like ritualized
combat .... Many men told us that is in fact the way
they see law school participation, as an exchange of
verbal retorts. You win when you silence your
opponent.48
Guinier correctly characterizes the oppressive atmosphere
created by the Socratic Method. She describes the antagonistic
environment that results in a silencing, from which women law
students suffer the greatest disparity.
The basic precept of the Method is its reliance on class
participation as the vehicle through which knowledge is disbursed.49
45. LANi GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 28 (1997). See also Jacobs, supra note 41; Catherine Weiss & Louise
Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1988); Janet Taber
et al., Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford
Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1209 (1988); Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender
Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137 (1988) [hereinafter Banks I]; Taunya Lovell
Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 527 (1990) [hereinafter Banks II];
LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION: A COMPARISON OF THE LAW SCHOOL
PERFORMANCE AND LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND MEN 1 (1996); Allison L.
Bowers, Women at the University of Texas School of Law: A Call for Action, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN
& L. 117 (2000).
46. GUINIER, supra note 45, at 12-13.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 13.
49. Jennifer L. Rosato, The Socratic Method and Women Law Students: Humanize,
Don't Feminize, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 37, 43 (1997) (stating, " ... [T]he
Socratic Method is a pedagogy characterized by self-discovery, in which the student learns to
approach legal problems through a dialogue guided by the law teacher.").
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The verbal back-and-forth between the professor and the students
ideally creates a stimulating atmosphere through which the law can be
exposed in its entirety.5 ° If this process does not engage women law
students, their academic growth will be stunted.
First-hand accounts of the Socratic Method's harsh effects are
particularly enlightening. 51 The following testimonials are statements
from female law students describing their experiences. These
testimonials serve to verify the debilitating effects of the Socratic
Method in the legal classroom.
Testimony #1: Silencing
"Law school is the most bizarre place I have ever been.
• . . [First year] was like a frightening out-of-body
experience. Lots of women agree with me. I have no
words to say what I feel. My voice from that year is
gone." 5
2
Testimony #2: Silencing
"Within my first few months at law school, I became
overwhelmed by the maleness of law school. Law
school felt formal and stiff and unyielding.... For me,
the result of this atmosphere was a silencing of
myself.
53
50. Garner, supra note 27, at 1604.
51. [M]any feminist narratives contain an epistemological claim. The
"scientific rationality" that prevails in our society - and in our legal
argumentation - privileges universality, statistical significance, and logical
deduction as ways of knowing about the world. Experiential narratives are
significant not only for the substantive message they convey but for the
way they claim to know what they know. Feminist narratives present
experience as a way of knowing that which should occupy a respected, or
in some cases a privileged position, in analysis and argumentation.
Abrams, supra note 40, at 976 (demonstrating the importance of narration in critical
feminist theory).
52. GUINIER, supra note 45, at 28.
53. Bowers, supra note 45, at 120.
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Testimony # 3: Oppressive Atmosphere
"Jeannie, a woman who rarely talks, suddenly joins the
discussion and begins a long and complex narrative.
Her narrative is intensely personal. It touches on her
past, her struggle for independence, her religious
training, her relationship with her father and husband,
and her difficulties being a "law student." It is through
this intricate, intersubjective structure that she perceives
and relates to the jurisprudential discussion raging
around her .... Suddenly feeling the sting of critical
incomprehension from her classmates, she abruptly
concludes with an anxious giggle, a murmur about
being unsure of whether she made sense to anyone and
an apology for not being able to better articulate her
point. ' 5
4
Testimony #4: Psychological Debilitation
"During the first year of law school, I felt alienated and
silenced. But most of all, I was surprised I felt this
way. I loved college and I fully expected to love law
school. I guess I should have been more prepared for
how law school would make me feel. Unlike most
students, I was aware of the feminist critique of law.
And yet I did not connect this critique of "law" with
law "school." School to me was a place where critiques
like these were made and debated, where people were
critical, where basic assumptions were questioned,
where ideas were created and challenged. Law school,
however, was much more like "law" than "school. 55
54. K.C. Worden, "Overshooting the Target: A Feminist Deconstruction of Legal
Education, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1141, 1145-46 (1985).
55. Bowers, supra note 45, at 119.
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Testimony #5: Psychological Debilitation
"Speaking from my own experience, law school makes
me feel as if I am trapped in a mental straitjacket. And
it makes me feel as if I am in danger of losing the
intellectual courage I possessed as an undergraduate." 56
B. Grade Disparity
Given the lower rate of female class participation within the
first year of law school, it is not surprising to note that in many law
schools there exists a disparity between the grades of first-year women
law students and their male counterparts.57 This irony is further
demonstrated in the knowledge that most women surpass men in pre-
law school academic performance. 58  The gap between the
undergraduate grades and grades during law school is stunning. The
question then becomes, what happens to women law students while in
law school that so significantly impairs their academic performance?
I argue that the adversarial atmosphere fostered by the Socratic
Method has a destructive ripple effect, which radiates from the initial
silencing of women law students 59 to psychological despair,60 and
culminates in lower academic performance. 61  Women's lower
academic achievement then translates into the loss of opportunities to
engage in other areas of the legal education process that could enhance
future job opportunities such as law review, moot court, and Order of
the Coif.6 2 This ripple effect extends into women's post-law school
56. Cheryl. M. Herden, Women in Legal Education: Feminist Analysis of Law School,
63 REV. Jup. U.P.R. 551, 552 (1994).
57. Neumann, supra note 39, at 321 (stating, "It thus appears that as a group women get
better grades than men in undergraduate school and worse grades than men in law school.
Wightman's data 'suggest that many women are not performing as well as they could be or
should be in the current legal education environment."').
58. Id. at 320.
59. Taber, supra note 45, at 1220 (stating, " ... women . . .are silenced by subtle
aspects of traditional legal education that deny the importance of their personal feelings and
beliefs.").
60. GtJINIER, supra note 45, at 52 (describing that "Many express deep feelings of
alienation from their backgrounds, passions, and communities.").
61. See infra notes 75-80.
62. Bowers, supra note 45, at 140-41 tbl.7-8 (2000) (demonstrating graphically the gap
between male and female representation on Order of the Coif and Honor Graduates
respectively).
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life, effecting career opportunities and wage earning capacity. 63
One of the first studies to expressly call for the removal of the
adversative teaching method from university curricula was the Yale
study.64 After interviewing a small group of women, and detailing
their experiences, the authors of the study poignantly concluded that in
law school "women don't exist, and aren't worth noticing if they try to
exist.",65  These words call attention to the powerful effects the
Socratic Method perpetuates by silencing and excluding women from
full and equal participation in legal education.
Also published in 1988, a study of Stanford University law
students and graduates extended the Yale study in scope and empirical
support. 66  The Stanford study concluded there was a preference by
more men than women for the Socratic Method.67 Similarly, in 1988,
Professor Taunya Banks completed a study on the experiences of
women in legal studies.68 The findings supported conclusions made in
prior studies. The study specifically found that "forty-seven percent of
those surveyed reported that one or more of their professors used
offensive humor, most of which was sexist in nature."
6
In 1994, the Gender Issues in Law Schools Committee of the
Ohio Joint Task Force on Gender Fairness commissioned a study (the
63. Bowers' study took place at the University of Texas School of Law, researching a
period of over thirteen academic years at the University of Texas. Discussing the impact of
gender-based grade disparity, Bowers wrote:
The larger gender gap in grades after the first year, however,
should be of particular concern. First-year grades are crucial. This is
because so many awards are based, at least in large part, on first year
grades. For example, first year grades help determine whether a student
becomes a law review member, where a student clerks after her second
year, and which (if any) judicial clerkship a student receives. These are all
experiences that significantly shape a student's career or define her range
of options. Thus, the greater disparity in GPAs after the first year has a
harsh impact on women - harsher than if the difference in average GPA
was greater at graduation.
Id. at 138.
64. Weiss & Melling, supra note 45, at 1357-59.
65. Id. at 1337.
66. Taber, supra note 45, at 1238-39. The Stanford study surveyed both students and
recent graduates. The student respondent group totaled 343 students, 54.8 percent of which
were male and 45.2 percent of which were female. Id. at 1232.
67. Id. at 1239.
68. Banks I, supra note 45, at 140.
69. Id. at 144. Banks I again identified the disparity in class participation between men
and women. Id. at 141. In 1990, Banks conducted a second study, which reinforced the
findings of the first study, particularly in regards to the silencing or low level of class
participation by women law students. Banks II, supra note 45, at 530.
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"Ohio study") 70 on the Socratic method and its effect on women law
students. Like its predecessors, the Ohio study recognized low levels
of class participation by female law students 71 and gender-bias on the
part of law professors. 72 In this study eighteen percent of women
reported feeling devalued by their professors in comparison to a mere
two percent of their male counterparts.73 Strikingly, forty-one percent
of the women surveyed reported greater feelings of mental inadequacy
in law school than prior to entry, as compared to only 16.5 percent of
men.
74
The 1996 Law School Admission Council (LSAC) recently
analyzed the effects of legal pedagogy relative to women and found a
definitive connection between lower grades and the Socratic Method.75
The LSAC report stated, "women who did worse than predicted in law
school 'had a larger percentage of their classes taught using the
Socratic method.' 76  Similarly, a 2000 study at the University of
Texas concluded that "law school themselves are contributing to the
lower female performance." 77 Although the study purported not to
examine the specific reasons why the disparity existed, it corresponded
with the conclusions of a study at the University of Pennsylvania (the
Penn study),78 stating:
The radical explanation, exemplified by the Penn study,
argues that the way to increase female performance in
law school is to change the structure of law schools.
This line of thought would eliminate or greatly curtail
the use of the socratic method in law schools; it would
change the whole way law is taught.
79
These words are highly significant, given that they expressly
identify the Socratic method as the chief factor in women's
70. Joan M. Krauskopf, Touching the Elephant: Perceptions of Gender in Nine Law
Schools, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (1994).
71. Id. at 314.
72. Id. at 326.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 328.
75. WIGHTMAN, supra note 45, at 1.
76. Id. at 99.
77. Bowers, supra note 45, at 164.
78. GUINIER, supra note 45.
79. Bowers, supra note 45, at 163.
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underachievement in law school. 80
The following tables graphically detail the gender discrepancy
between male and female law students. 81 The first table shows the
gender differentials in undergraduate G.P.A. 82 The second table shows
the gender differentials in LSAT scores for that same academic year.
83
The third table shows the gender differentials in class rank during each
of the three years of law school.84
Undergraduate G.P.A.
Academic Year 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Female 3.13 3.13 3.15 3.16 3.16
Male 3.03 3.04 3.06 3.06 3.07
Female .10 .09 .09 .10 .09
Differential
LSAT Differential
Academic Year 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Female 151.5 150.6 150.7 150.7 150.7
Male 153.2 152.4 152.6 152.4 152.0
Male 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.3
Differential I I
Percentage of Students in Top Fiftieth Percentile of Law School Class
Academic Year First Year Second Year Third Year
Female 42.8 43.2 43.9
Male 53.8 55.2 54.7
Male Differential 11.0 12.0 10.8
80. Richard Neumann discussed similar conclusions on the debilitating effects of the
Socratic method. Neumann, supra note 39. Neumann compiled national statistics regarding
female law students, which supported the conclusions in the previous studies regarding the
contrast between the undergraduate grades earned by both sexes and law school grades. The
study stated that:
[Als a group women get better grades than men in undergraduate school
and worse grades than men in law school. . . . The larger grade
differentials noted in the Penn and Texas studies and the lower law review
participation at the producer schools both hint that the pedagogical
environment may be worse for women at the top-ranked schools than in
legal education generally.
Id. at 321-22.
81. Id. at 320.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. GUINIER, supra note 45, at 38.
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These tables dramatically illustrate the essential argument of
this article. The fact that women consistently academically outrank
men prior to law school admission, and then during law school their
grades become grossly disproportionate, reflects the egregious effects
of the Socratic Method. The loss of access to an equal education is
perpetuated through this pedagogy. This disparity cries out for a more
humane approach in presenting information to students - specifically
women law students.V5  Though many professors have implemented
modified versions of the Socratic method, it remains the dominant
form of teaching in law schools across the country, holding almost half
of its student body hostage to its tyrannical effects.8 6
V. PROPONENTS OF THE SOCRATIC METHOD: EXPOSING THE FLAWS
Professor Jennifer Rosato of the Brooklyn School of Law is a
leading advocate of the Socratic Method. Rosato claims that its
pedagogical benefits far outweigh any minimal impact it may have
upon women law students.87 Rosato bases her observation largely on
her personal experience as a law professor.88  She argues that the
85. Because law school's educational mission is so intertwined with the goal
of selecting students for entry into a competitive profession, much of its
pedagogy, including examination formats, is designed to rank students.
The idea is that those who succeed in this highly competitive and
individualistic culture will do well as lawyers. As a result, the law school
valorizes sorting, rewards people who think fast but not always those who
think deeply, and relies upon uniform rules and standards that may appear
to treat all students the same but do not necessarily develop each student's
true potential. We conclude that law schools such as the one we studied
not only reflect or reproduce larger sets of social stratification they create
and legitimize them.
Id. at 2.
86. "Notwithstanding ... complaints [leveled against the Socratic Method] the Socratic
Method continues to be the primary pedagogy used by law school teachers." Rosato, supra
note 49, at 37.
Although law teachers generally have salutary educational goals and some
individual law teachers have intuited and developed insightful
experimental instruction, law school instruction as a whole, remains
locked in an instructional methodology of dubious merit. That method
characterized here as the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model, has
persisted since Christopher Langdell's tenure at Harvard Law School in
the 1870's.
Schwartz, supra at note 26, at 349.
87. Rosato, supra note 49, at 39.
88. Id. at 43. Rosato relies heavily upon her personal observations as a law professor in
defending the Socratic Method. For example, she states, "As a legal educator and feminist
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Socratic Method is not to blame for the denigration reported in the
various studies done on its effects. 89 Rosato lists several other factors
that contribute to the oppressive atmosphere that women experience
including inappropriate conduct by professors and students, 9 and a
lack of institutional support for women law students.91 She argues that
these particular factors, not the Socratic Method, are primary
contributors to law school's denigrating atmosphere.
92
Rosato attempts to characterize the factors causing women's
negative law school experiences as simply attributes of law school,
rather than direct effects of the Socratic Method. Such a distinction is
naYve. The atmosphere of ridicule and denigration identified by
Rosato is an extension of the environment the Socratic Method
creates.93  The encouragement of competition, and adversarial
interactions construct an environment where ridicule and offensive
remarks are allowed to thrive. 94  Therefore, while Rosato and other
proponents attempt to mitigate the Socratic Method's role in creating
this atmosphere by identifying collateral effects, its centrality in
constructing the silencing and denigration cannot be ignored.
Further, Rosato characterizes the Socratic Method as one of
self-discovery, wherein students learn to approach legal problems
through guided dialogue. 95  She has even argued that it is an
empowering method of learning for all students because it is based on
participation. 96  Rosato cloaks the lack of participation by female
students in benign terms, by characterizing the silencing as moments
wherein female students are silently participating in the discussion by
following the dialogue, and thinking about what questions they could
ask and answer themselves.97 However, she provides little empirical
who regularly uses the Socratic Method, I think that radically changing its use at this time
would be a mistake." Id. at 49.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. ld. at 52-53.
92. Id. at 53.
93. Garner, supra note 27, at 1598. "[Scholars] have joined students who have 'attacked
the Socratic method as infantilizing, demeaning, dehumanizing, sadistic, a tactic for promoting
hostility and competition among students, self-serving, and destructive of positive ideological
values."'
94. See id. at 1601.
95. Rosato, supra note 49, at 43.
96. Id. at 43-44.
97. Id. at 44 (stating, "Other students are participating silently in the discussion by
following the dialogue, and are thinking about which questions they could ask and answer
themselves. It is as if all are players in an exciting game with their hands on the buzzers,
ready to respond at a moment's notice.").
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evidence to rebut over thirty years of studies demonstrating the
profound detrimental effects of the Socratic Method on female law
students. 98 Her arguments rely on her experiential observations as a
law professor, and dismiss the existing research without any
countervailing support of her own to support her contentions.99
Another supporter of the Socratic Method, Professor Elizabeth
Garrett, maintains that the Socratic Method teaches students the skill
of public speaking.'00 Garrett also argues that the Socratic Method is
the most effective means of teaching large groups of students, while
ensuring that the students take active roles in securing their
understanding of the information.' 0' As she argues:
A teaching strategy which includes calling on students
without giving them prior notice is one of the best ways
to foster critical thinking for all members of such a
large group. No student is certain before class whether
she will be called on to discuss difficult issues or to
respond to answers provided by one of her colleagues.
She must therefore pay close attention to the discussion
between the professor and other students so she will be
ready to play a meaningful role. Moreover, the Socratic
method places some responsibility on students to think
about the questions silently and participate actively on
their own; the element of surprise provides a powerful
incentive for them to meet that responsibility.l
0 2
This line of reasoning typifies proponent's views of the
Socratic Method. 10 3 It characterizes the method in benign terms, as a
means of keeping students in a state of surprise or on their academic
toes. These arguments focus on the ideal version of the Socratic
Method, one in which students are actively engaged in an interrogative
process that will lead them to uncover all aspects of the law.
The reality is that the Socratic Method is more similar to the
combative analogies previously described than to this ideal. 104 The
98. See generally Rosato, supra note 49.
99. Id.
100. Elizabeth Garrett, Becoming Lawyers The Role of the Socratic Method in Modern
Law Schools, 1 GREEN BAG 199, 202 (1998).
101. Id.at201-02.
102. Id. at202.
103. See Rosato, supra note 49; Garrett, supra note 100.
104. Garner, supra note 27, at 1601.
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arguments in favor of the Socratic Method do not take into account the
abusive manner in which the questions are often asked. 10 5 They do not
fully appreciate that students are put on the spot and burdened with the
need to respond quickly, while fighting the pangs of anxiety and fear
that characterize the moment.'0 6 They also do not reflect the nature of
the atmosphere as ripe for an adversarial encounter, extending from
the instructor to the student and manifesting itself in an oppressive
learning environment. 0 7 Finally, they do not consider that this
adversarial atmosphere results in the disproportionate silencing of
women law students,' ° 8 precluding them from effectively participating
in the banter that is supposed to lead to understanding.'0 9 The Socratic
Method ultimately denies women equal access to learning by fostering
an adversarial atmosphere. This adversarial atmosphere then translates
into silencing, lower participation, and ultimately, lower grades.
David Garner explores the Socratic Method in relation to
feminist criticism, which holds that women receive a different
education than men. 10 He does not advocate for the abolition of the
Socratic method, but rather puts forward that it should be modified."'
Garner outlines three factors in favor of maintaining the Socratic
Method despite feminist criticism. 112 He explains that it teaches basic
skills, 1 3 it benefits both economic and time concerns, 14 and its
maintenance avoids the perception that women are incapable of being
successful at what is inherently a male-model teaching strategy. 
1 5
Garner's third point is an argument commonly advanced in
favor of the Socratic Method. Proponents of this view maintain that
discarding the Socratic Method does little more than give support to
the idea that women are incapable of succeeding under traditional
105. Id. at 1601-02.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Judith D. Fischer, Portia Unbound: The Effects of a Supportive Law School
Environment on Women and Minority Students, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1996)
(cataloguing the positive effects of a more humane approach to legal education). "A growing
body of studies and critiques examines the negative impact the traditional law school
environment has on women and minority students. This research revealed that law school
negatively impacts women regarding self-esteem, class participation, mentoring, and
alienation." Id. at 81.
109. Id. at 83.
110. Garner, supra note 27, at 1648.
111. Id. (stating, "The solution, however, is not to scrap the method entirely, but rather to
transform it to reflect the changing nature of what it means to be a lawyer.").
112. Id. at 1635.
113. Id. at 1635-36.
114. Id. at 1636.
115. Id. at 1637.
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models of learning.'1 6  They argue that women are educationally
multifaceted, and able to learn under a host of modalities including
traditional models like the Socratic Method.' 1 7 Proponents posit that
the suggestion that women cannot achieve under traditional forms of
pedagogy feeds into age-old stereotypes that have foreclosed women
from positions of power. 118 They argue that by adopting more women-
friendly teaching methods, law schools will actually disadvantage
women by lending credence to gender stereotypes." 
9
This argument is inherently flawed. Those advocates of the
Socratic Method who recognize and even admit its adversative nature
only bolster the argument in favor of disposing of it. Their argument
implies that to admit women are being systemically handicapped is to
admit that the nature of women is fundamentally ill-equipped to deal
with the rigorous demands of the pedagogy. 120 The extension of such
an idea is itself reliant on dangerous stereotypes and exaggerated
logical leaps. Arguing against the use of the Socratic Method simply
recognizes that an unfairness in legal education exists against women.
It is not a construction of the idea that women are mentally inferior to
men. It is not an admission that women are incapable of responding to
its challenging demands, as is evident by the thousands of successful
female law students. 12 1 It is, however, the recognition that in order fortrue equality to take shape, it is necessary to reconstruct the field so
116. Rosato, supra note 49, at 39-40.
117. The Socratic method is the most effective pedagogy for allowing women
students to become proficient in the primary language of doctrinal legal
analysis. Even if it could be demonstrated that the Socratic method
negatively affected women, I fear that accommodating women students by
adopting more "women-friendly" teaching methods would send a
dangerous message that women law students cannot withstand the rigors
of the Socratic method and thus do not belong in the law school
classroom, the courtroom or the boardroom. That message would prevent
women from realizing their potential as law students and lawyers by
indulging stereotypes that have previously prevented women from
advancing in the profession.
Id.
118. Id. at 54.
119. Id.
120. [E]ven if it could be shown that the Socratic Method negatively affects
women students, as some of the current studies suggest, the Socratic
Method should not be circumscribed simply to accommodate women. To
do so only patronizes women law students and reinforces the view still
held by some that women do not belong in law school or the legal
profession - or at least not at the highest levels of achievement.
Id. at 58.
121. Neumann, supra note 39, at 314-15 (demonstrating statistically how women are
treated in ABA-approved law schools).
MARGINS
THE MASTER'S TOOLS
that it incorporates teaching strategies that do not adversely impact one
group and advantage another. Abolishing the Socratic Method does
not mean that women of themselves are handicapped in their ability to
think legally. It means that this teaching strategy creates an academic
impairment in women that, prior to its use, did not exist.'
22
Proponents of the Socratic Method fail to focus on the
silencing, fear, intimidation, and other psychologically debilitating
aspects created by the Socratic Method. 123 They also fail to question
why women should be subjected to this type of academic torture. The
response that it is merely to prove that women have greater mental
endurance than their male counterparts, and are able to succeed despite
of these effects, is insufficient. Imagine the possible academic
performance, if the mental energy required to adapt to the Socratic
Method was re-channeled into the actual process of learning the law.
VI. ENVISIONING A "PORTIA METHOD": AN ALTERNATIVE PEDAGOGY
Judith Fischer, an Assistant Professor of Law at Chapman
University School of Law researched the revolutionary effects of a
more humane approach to legal study than that put forward by the
Socratic Method.124 In 1994, the university announced the founding of
its new law school in a more supportive atmosphere of high idealism,
and professionalism in a humane learning environment. 125  The
concept of a supportive atmosphere is more extensively defined by the
study as one that rejects the "false dichotomy that rigorous study and
122. Id. at 321.
123. Many women reveal their alienation from law school by participating only
rarely in class. As academics and various organizations study the impact
of gender on the law school experience, one of the most persistent
observations is that women speak in class less frequently and more briefly
than men do. This silence contributes to a destructive cycle: if women are
disproportionately silent in the classroom, they can reinforce their own
feelings of exclusion and incompetence. Silence in the classroom may not
only affect the students' feelings about law school but also impair their
performance on exams as well. To the extent that discussion and Socratic
dialogue in the classroom enable students to practice skills of legal
reasoning and argument, women's disproportionate silence could mean
that they are getting fewer or more abbreviated opportunities to hone their
skills.
Jennifer Gerarda Brown, To Give Them Countenance: The Case for a Woman's Law
School, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 11 (1999).
124. Fischer, supra note 108, at 82.
125. Id. at 95.
2003
[VOL. 3:125
nurturing are mutually exclusive." 126  The university relied on the
writings of William Kullman and Carrie Menkel-Meadow who defined
a supportive learning atmosphere as "the ethic of care."'1 27 This ethic
of care is comprised of five basic tenets: (1) tempering the excesses of
the Socratic Method and using alternative methods of teaching; (2)
distributing more handouts; (3) giving more exercises, practice
examinations, and other feedback; (4) building better relationships
among students and faculty; and (5) hiring more women and minority
professors. 28 Chapman University took a series of steps to emulate
this more supportive atmosphere, including the hiring of a diverse
faculty, which included a high ratio of women and minority
professors. 129  Chapman also hired a large number of women for
administrative positions at the law school. 130  After the new hiring
practices went into effect, the university's faculty was comprised of
fifty percent women and twenty-one percent minorities. 131  The
university took a revolutionary stance on its educational approach. It
restructured its academic program to include mentoring programs,
individualized tutoring, outlining classes, rearranging high anxiety
courses like first year writing and research by gradually introducing
such courses into one-unit, pass-fail classes, decreasing student-faculty
ratios to 18:1, and limiting class size to sixty-five students for
substantive courses and twenty-one students for skills courses.
1 32
The Chapman Study powerfully demonstrates that women and
minorities fare better under this environment than at other law schools
that implement more adversarial types of pedagogy. 33  Fischer
compared the Chapman data to the data accumulated by the Ohio
study. 134  Chapman University's female participation rates were
double that of Ohio. 135  In the area of self-esteem in the Chapman
study women reported a markedly higher percentage of feeling that
126. Id. at 89.
127. Id. at 89 n.43-44 and accompanying text. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to
Law School, " 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 78 (1988); William F. Kullman, Feminist Methodologies
in the Law School Classroom: Listening for a Change, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 117
(1994).
128. Fischer, supra note 108, at 89-90.
129. Id at 95.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 95-96.
133. Id. at 99.
134. Id. at 102.
135. Id. at 99.
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their values were respected than the Ohio percentages.1 36 The area of
greatest promise is in relation to grade performance. In a supportive
environment, like that fostered at Chapman University, startling
statistical evidence surfaces. At the end of their first year at Chapman,
the women's grades were actually higher than the men's grades.
37
This result is compelling when compared to other law schools where
women, who start out academically equivalent to their male
counterparts, receive significantly lower grades than the men in the
first year of law school.138
The Chapman University model powerfully illustrates the
effects of a supportive approach to legal instruction on women. It adds
to the arguments in favor of abandoning the adversative teaching
model, and the development of similar humane approaches to legal
education.
VII. BUILDING AN EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . ,139
These words from the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution were adopted in 1868.140 Historically, this Amendment
was incorporated to protect newly freed African-American slaves from
unfair state action and discrimination. 14  The scope of its initial
protection has been protracted to include other groups whose
classifications by state actors for different treatment was suspect,
extending from race through gender, alienage, and legitimacy.142
The argument against the sexist pedagogy of the Socratic
Method finds a basis in this constitutional principle of equality. In
order to make an effective argument on the basis of gender
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, one must satisfy
three factors: (1) the recognition of a suspect class, in this case gender;
(2) coupled with discriminatory impact that has been statistically
136. Id. at 103.
137. Id. at 105.
138. Id. The author relies on statistics discussed in the Penn Study. See supra note 45.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
141. Gerald L. Neuman, Constitutional Equality: Equal Protection, "General Equality"
and Economic Discrimination From a U.S. Perspective, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 281, 282 (1999)
(explaining, "The Fourteenth Amendment was then adopted in 1868 to ensure a degree of
federal control over the rights of individuals in the states.").
142. Id. at 281-82.
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demonstrated; and (3) discriminatory intent on the part of the state
actor. 143
The application of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection doctrine must be premised on a discriminatory state
action. 144 The Fourteenth Amendment does not regulate the actions of
private individuals.1 45  The Supreme Court defines a state action
simply as an act sanctioned or authorized by the state. 146 Therefore, in
seeking remedies under the equal protection doctrine, the suit will be
most effective when brought against state-funded universities.
In establishing the state action, the issue of academic freedom
and freedom of expression bears discussion at this juncture. In relation
to the Socratic Method, freedom of expression becomes a competing
constitutional principle in regard to gender discrimination. It could be
argued that it is unconstitutional to ban the Socratic Method as a
teaching strategy, as such a ban violates the right to free speech and
academic freedom. The Association of American University
Professors defines academic freedom as protecting the university's
four principles of freedom. 147 The university may determine "for itself
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall
be taught, and who may be admitted to study."' 
4 8
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has insulated academic
instructors from the label of state actors or agents in proceedings
brought under the First Amendment. 149  The Court has held that
143. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (stating, "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .....
145. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 6 (1883).
146. [C]ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the constitution against state
aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals,
unsupported by state authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or
executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by
any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that
individual; an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is true, whether
they affect his person, his property, or his reputation; but if not sanctioned
in some way by the State, or not done under State authority, his rights
remain in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the
laws of the state for redress.
Id. at 17.
147. Michael A. Olivas, Reflections on Professorial Academic Freedom: Second
Thoughts on the Third Essential Freedom, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1835 (1993).
148. Id.
149. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (stating, "The classroom is peculiarly the
'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."').
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academic freedom requires safeguarding from state intrusion. As it
iterates in Keyishian v. Board of Regents:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding
academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all
of us .... That freedom is therefore a special concern
of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. The
vigilant protection of constitutional freedom is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American
Schools. 15
0
However, the right to academic freedom is not an absolute
one,151 and the abolition of the Socratic Method does not constitute a
violation of the First Amendment. This is so because, while the Court
has historically protected the right to free speech and academic
freedom, 152 it has also recognized the substantial constitutional interest
in protecting against gender discrimination, as proscribed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.'
53
In United States v. Virginia (" VM'), the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its overarching commitment to protection from gender
discrimination even against academic pedagogies. 154  In VM/, the
Court struck down a form of sexist pedagogy that excluded women
from participating in a "state-supplied educational opportunity [in
which] they [were] fit to engage," 15 solely because of their gender.156
The Court denied Virginia's right to discriminate against women
through a teaching methodology - the adversative method - that was
based entirely on stereotype and sexist tradition.' 57 The Court stated:
Virginia maintains that these methodological
differences are 'justified pedagogically,' based on
'important differences between men and women in
learning and developmental needs,' 'psychological and
150. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
151. United States v. Va., 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1409 (W.D. Va. 1991).
152. Id.
153. U.S. CONST. amend XIV; see also United States v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996)
[hereinafter VM/] (" . .. the Court, in post-Reed decisions, has carefully inspected official
action that closes a door or denies opportunity to women . .
154. VA/, 518 U.S. at 549, 550-51.
155. Id.at551.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 549.
2003
[VOL. 3:125
sociological differences' Virginia describes as 'real'
and 'not stereotypes.' 1
58
It is on behalf of these women that the United States
has instituted this suit, and it is for them that a remedy
must be crafted, a remedy that will end their exclusion
from a state-supplied educational opportunity for which
they are fit, a decree that will 'bar like discrimination in
the future."' 5 9
In VM, Virginia raised the defense of academic freedom by
arguing that VMI's adversative method of teaching was a legitimate
contribution to diversity in the Virginia higher education system.
160
They argued that excluding women is substantially related to their
mission of educational diversity.' 61 However, the Court rejected this
argument, finding that Virginia's claim was based upon stereotype,
and struck down VMI's single-sex educational policy.162
Through its language, the Court propels itself across the hurdle
of academic freedom, and declares its commitment to gender equality.
The Court does so in two ways - by reiterating its commitment to
equality in education, and through the creation of a remedy that is not
temporally or substantively static. Its remedy can be applied and
extended to all "like" forms of gender discrimination in the
educational arena. 163  Therefore, this language offers a means of
overcoming the principle of academic freedom while simultaneously
dismantling similar types of sexist pedagogies, including the Socratic
Method.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 549-51.
160. Id. at 524.
161. Id. at 549.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 551.
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VIII. GENDER AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
One of the foremost cases to establish the standard of review
for gender cases is the 1971 Supreme Court case of Reed v. Reed.164
Reed set the level of constitutional scrutiny for gender discrimination
at the rational basis standard. 165 This standard requires the state to
show that its action was "reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation., 166
There are three tiers of scrutiny currently employed by the
Supreme Court in equal protection cases, the rational basis standard,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.' 67 Of these three tiers, the
rational basis standard offers the lowest level of protection. 16s Reed
added a crucial brick to the foundation of constitutional review for
gender discrimination, in that it provides for the minimum rational
basis protection against inequality. Reed, more importantly, was the
first time that the Supreme Court struck down a sex-based regulation
based upon the equal protection doctrine.
169
Two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson,170 the Court
considered the possibility of giving gender discrimination cases the
same standard of review as warranted by allegations of racial
discrimination. 17' The Court was asked to consider the
constitutionality of federal statutes that required women military
service members to prove their spouses' dependency in order to obtain
increased benefits.' By a plurality of the Court, Justice Brennan,
along with Douglas, White, and Marshall, held that cases involving
sex as a suspect classification were subject to strict scrutiny. 173 This
decision, however, never gained a majority of the Court, and later
cases would solidify the standard of review for cases involving gender
164. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
165. Id. at 75-76.
166. Id.
167. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 628-33 (13th
ed. 1997).
168. Id.
169. 404 U.S. at 75. See also Carol Pressman, The House that Ruth Built: Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Gender and Justice, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 311 (1997).
170. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 688 (stating, "With these considerations in mind, we can only conclude that
classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national
origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.").
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discrimination at intermediate scrutiny. 174
The clearest articulation of intermediate scrutiny, prior to VM/,
is found in Craig v. Boren.175 The Supreme Court in Craig set the
level of protection for cases involving gender discrimination at
intermediate scrutiny. 176  Jnterestingly, the increased scrutiny was
implemented on behalf of a male petitioner. 177 In Craig v. Boren, the
Court markedly departed from its holding in Reed by announcing a
new standard under which issues of gender discrimination are to be
reviewed. 178  The Court reformulated that standard as intermediate
review, stating, "classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives. '179 Subsequent rulings since Craig
have upheld the intermediate standard of review as the level for gender
discrimination. 180
In the 1982 decision Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan,'18 the Court moved one step closer to applyin the strict
scrutiny standard to a gender-based classification. 18  Justice
O'Connor's opinion required the state to carry the burden for
demonstrating an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for
classifications along gender lines.1 83  The "exceedingly persuasive"
language was a stronger articulation of the intermediate standard of
review than previously stated in Craig.184
In VM!J, Justice Ginsberg, writing for the Court, reiterated the
"exceedingly persuasive" language in her analysis of the intermediate
scrutiny standard, stating "[f]ocusing on the differential treatment or
denial of opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court
174. Centennial Panel, Two Decades of Intermediate Scrutiny: Evaluating Equal
Protection for Women, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 7 (1997).
175. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The articulation of the intermediary standard
articulated in Craig would be extended in VMI. See infra text accompanying notes 188-93.
176. Id. at 197.
177. Id. at 192.
178. Id. at 197.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380 (1979); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
181. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
182. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723. In a 5-4 ruling, the Court struck down a state-supported
university's policy for excluding qualified men from being admitted to the school's nursing
program. Id.
183. Id. at 731.
184. Compare id. (stating the relationship between the classification and the State's
objectives must be "exceedingly persuasive," indicating an increased level of scrutiny), with
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (stating the relationship must be "substantially related").
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must determine whether the proffered justification is 'exceedingly
persuasive."" 85  Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in VMJ
branded this language "strict scrutiny."' 86 He noted that the analysis
prior to this decision was the "substantial relation" test stated in
Craig.187 Some legal scholars have agreed with Justice Scalia that the
standard of review set in VM/ was the heightened standard of strict
scrutiny. 188
The Court in VM reemphasized that the standard of review for
classifications involving gender is the intermediate standard.
189
However, it raised the burden of proof to a level almost tantamount to
strict scrutiny by increasing the demands of the state to sustain its
classifications.19  This posture exposed the Court's commitment to the
dissolution of pedagogies that deny women equal access to
education. 19! It provided that the state alone carries the demanding
burden of proving the "exceedingly persuasive" connection between
the policy and the gender classification. 192  Further, the Court gave
several guidelines to instruct the state on how to demonstrate this
exceedingly persuasive connection.' 93  It maintained that the state
"must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females."'
' 94
It is the equal protection doctrine that provides the lens through
185. United States v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
186. Id. at 571 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating "... The United States urged us to hold in
this litigation 'that strict scrutiny is the correct constitutional standard for evaluating
classifications that deny opportunities based on their sex.' . . . The Court, while making no
reference to the Government's argument, effectively accepts it.").
187. Id. at 568.
188. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg, for the Court, applied super-heightened
scrutiny to governmental gender classifications, requiring states to
demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for discriminatory
policies. This standard represents an enhanced intermediate standard of
review more exacting that that articulated in Craig v. Boren. Furthermore,
while classifications based upon gender or illegitimacy traditionally have
triggered heightened scrutiny, in Virginia the Court has distinguished
gender challenges as triggering even higher scrutiny.
Peter S. Smith, The Demise of Three-Tier Review: Has the United States Supreme Court
Adopted a "'Sliding Scale" Approach Toward Equal Protection Jurisprudence?" 23 J.
CONTEMP. L. 475, 500 (1997).
189. VM!, 518 U.S. at 532-33. See also Colling O'Conner Udell, Signaling a New
Direction in Gender Classification Scrutiny: United States v. Virginia, 29 CoNN. L. REv. 521,
541 (1996).
190. See Smith, supra note 188, at 500.
191. VM/,581 U.S. at 549-51.
192. Id. at 533.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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which the Socratic Method's disparate effects can be constitutionally
examined. The constitution's basic principles of fairness and equality
protect citizens from unfair discriminatory practices on the part of the
state. 195  While this ideal does not eviscerate the state's ability to
balance the interests of its citizens, it eliminates the state's right to
invidiously discriminate. 196 If the state laws apply disproportionately
to one group without at least a rational basis for its enactment, then
that law will not survive constitutional scrutiny.' 97  This section
explores these formulations specifically in regards to gender
classifications. Personnel Administrator v. Feeney articulates the
formula for proving gender discrimination under the equal protection
doctrine. 198 In Feeney, female non-veterans brought suit against the
State of Massachusetts, arguing that a state statute giving an "absolute
preference" for civil service positions to veterans ultimately excluded
women from consideration for employment. 199 In its reasoning, the
Court identifies two key factors in establishing a prima facie case for
equal protection violations involving gender - discriminatory impact
and discriminatory intent.2 °0
A. Proving Impact
Disparate impact is a significant factor considered by the Court
in finding an equal protection violation. This concept has undergone a
series of metamorphoses before reaching its present-day meaning.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins20 1 is a seminal case in relation to the disparate
impact requirement. 202 It was one of the earliest cases to articulate the
significance of the disparate impact requirement as proof of an equal
protection violation. 20 P In Yick Wo, the Court struck down a San
Francisco ordinance that governed the operation of laundries in
wooden buildings. 20 4 The Court found that the law, though facially
195. Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 213, 214-15, 217 (1991) (exploring a "limited history of modem equal protection."). See
also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
196. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
197. Id. (stating that "When the basic classification is rationally based, uneven effects
upon particular groups with a class are ordinarily of no constitutional concern.").
198. Id. at 274.
199. Id. at 259.
200. Id. at 274.
201. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 373-74.
204. Id.
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neutral, was applied disproportionately to adversely affect Chinese
applicants. 20 5 Justice Matthews stated:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand,
so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution. "
206
These words establish the significance of discriminatory impact in the
presence of facially neutral laws.
Similarly, the Socratic Method appears facially neutral as
applied to gender discrimination. It is a pedagogical strategy used to
educate both male and female law students. It is a teaching tool that
has been in place in American law schools for well over one hundred
207years. Advocates of the Socratic Method cite benefits for both male
and female law students, including contentions that it is the most
efficient and economic means of educating law students, it promotes
active learning, it furthers awareness of the complexity of the law, and
it enables students to be self-taught by taking a hands on approach to
their studies.20 8 Therefore, the Method satisfies the neutrality test and
would likely be treated as gender neutral on its face. However, as with
the statute in Yick Wo, despite appearing facially neutral, the Socratic
Method has a disparate impact on female law students. The
adversative nature of the Method creates a combative atmosphere,
which leads to silencing, which then leads to lower academic
performance.20 9
The Court would likely find that the Socratic Method has a
disparate impact on female law students. Extensive studies detail and
empirically support the understanding of the disproportionate effect of
this method on the academic performance and achievement of women
law students. 210 These studies have detailed the damaging effects of
the Socratic Method on women law students, including its silencing
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Schwartz, supra note 26, at 350.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
210. See supra Part IV.
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effect, antagonistic atmosphere, and the resulting lower academic
scores.211
The disparate impact prong of the equal protection doctrine is
satisfied by almost thirty years of study on the Socratic Method
demonstrating its damaging effects on women in law school.212 The
recognition of its stifling effects on female law students coupled with
its detrimental academic effects resulting in lower female
representation on law reviews, moot court, and Order of the Coif,
2 13
the possibility of long term detrimental effects on future career options
and status; 2 14  to the psychologically debilitating effects
disproportionately reported by female law students; 215 all demonstrate
the need for reform and elimination.216
B. Proving Intent
Discriminatory intent is the second significant factor
considered by the Court when reviewing a potential equal protection
violation. Feeney217 is the foremost case to construct this two-fold
formula of discriminatory impact plus intent in gender cases. 2 18 In its
analysis, the Court articulated the grounds that would govern the intent
standard in cases involving gender discrimination under the equal
protection doctrine. 219 The Court crafted a two-part test to determine
whether an intent to discriminate against women existed. 220 The first
part of the test questioned the gender neutrality of the statutory
classification.2 2 ' The second part questioned, if the statute was not
overtly or covertly discriminatory, whether the adverse effect reflected
211. See supra Part IV.
212. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 260 (recognizing the significance of impact in proving an equal
protection claim, but balancing impact with the intent to discriminate requirement.). See also
Robert Nelson, To Infer or Not to Infer a Discriminatory Purpose: Rethinking Equal
Protection Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 334, 336 (1986) (stating, "When an equal protection
claimant challenges a facially neutral statute, often the only evidence of discrimination is a
statistical showing of adverse impact upon a particular class alongside a government
procedure susceptible to abuse.").
213. Bowers, supra note 45, at 140-41 tbl.7-8.
214. Id
215. Brown, supra note 123, at 11.
216. Worden, supra note 54, at 1148-49.
217. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
218. Id. at 273.
219. Jd.
220. Id. at 274.
221. Id.
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invidious gender-based discrimination.222 In its reasoning, the Court
articulated the role of state intent in a "because of' rather than an "in
spite of" paradigm. As it explains:
It would ...be disingenuous to say that the adverse
consequences of this legislation for women were
unintended, in the sense that they were not volitional or
in the sense that they were not foreseeable.
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies
more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences. It implies that the decision maker ...
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.
The "because of' level of proof requires the plaintiff to show
that the government was not only aware of the foreseeable
discriminatory effect, but that the government chose this action
because of the discriminatory impact.
The Court reasoned that to maintain a gender-based equal
protection claim, even in the face of the most dramatic showing of de
facto discrimination, the plaintiffs must establish the intent of the state
to purposely discriminate. 5  It characterized the foreseeability of
discrimination, on an otherwise neutral statute, as an inference that
does not "ripen into proof., 226 The Court set the intent bar incredibly
high, and in applying this rationale it held against the female non-
veteran plaintiffs. 227 The Court maintained that the statute did not
222. Id. The court stated that "impact provides an important starting point," in
identifying invidious discrimination. Id. Other factors considered were gleaned from the
formula articulated in the Arlington Heights decision. Those factors include the historical
background of the decision, the sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision,
departures from the normal procedural sequence, and the legislative or administrative history.
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1977).
223. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278-79.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 274.
226. But in this inquiry - made as it is under the Constitution - an inference is a
working tool, not a synonym for proof. When, as here, the impact is
essentially an unavoidable consequence of a legislative policy that has in
itself always been deemed to be legitimate, and when, as here, the
statutory history and all of the available evidence affirmatively
demonstrate the opposite, the inference simply fails to ripen into proof.
Id. at 279 n.25.
227. ld.at280-81.
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discriminate against women, but against non-veterans, a group that
includes both men and women.22 8 The Court reasoned they lacked the
evidence to satisfy the requirement for discriminatory intent, stating
that impact alone does not provide enough evidence to support an
equal protection claim.229
Through Feeney, the Supreme Court elevated the burden of
proof to plaintiffs seeking redress under the equal protection doctrine
in gender discrimination cases. In its honing of the intent standard,
the Court provided that, in order to maintain a claim under this
doctrine, a plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie showing of both
intent and impact.2 3 1 The Feeney Court discusses this standard and its
application to gender discrimination cases, maintaining that the
foreseeable effects of disparate impact provide some evidence of
discrimination but do not compel such a result.
232
Applying the Feeney level of proof for intent to the Socratic
Method poses a significant and almost impenetrable barrier. This is
because the intention of state universities is not to overtly discriminate
against women law students. The surge in the female law student
population nationally attests to the acceptance of women's presence in
233legal education. However, the nature of the discrimination involved
with the Socratic Method is subtly covert. It is the outcome of a form
of pedagogy that was constructed at time when women were not
allowed to attend law school.234 The audience intended for the
Socratic Method was largely white, male law students.235
The glimmer of hope for this argument rests in the
understanding that, given the thirty years of research calling for its
elimination and detailing its inefficiency, the Socratic Method still
228. Id.
229. Id. at 275 (stating, "Just as there are cases in which impact alone can unmask an
invidious classification . . . there are others, in which - notwithstanding impact - the
legitimate noninvidious purposes of a law cannot be missed. This is one.").
230. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
231. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp, 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
232. See supra note 225.
233. A CURRENT GLANCE OF WOMEN IN THE LAW, COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION, AM. BAR Assoc. (2000) (citing FIRST YEAR ENROLLMENT IN ABA APPROVED
LAW SCHOOLS 1947-2000, LEGAL EDUCATION DIVISION, AM. BAR ASSOC., available at
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/femstats.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2003) (on file with
MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
234. STEVENS, supra note 13, at 56.
235. Garner, supra note 27, at 1599 (stating that Langdell developed the case method in
the early 1870's); see also STEVENS, supra note 13, at 82 (noting that the first woman did not
attend law school until 1876).
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remains the dominant form of legal pedagogy. 236 This foreseeability
on the part of state law schools provides a sliver of relief to those
trying to meet the otherwise stringent intent requirement. The Court
in Feeney discussed the significance of forseeability.2 37  As it
questions, "Where a law's consequences are that inevitable, can they
meaningfully be described as unintended?, 238 The Court answers in
the negative, and forecloses this possibility with the injection of the
"because of' requirement. 239  Therefore, in order to sustain an
argument against the use of the Socratic Method it must be
demonstrated that law schools implement the Socratic Method because
they intend to discriminate against women, and not merely because
discrimination is a foreseeable possibility.
This intent requirement would impede the application of equal
protection doctrine to women seeking protection from gender
discrimination as engendered by the Socratic Method. The intent
strand becomes a significant hurdle, and the possibility of overcoming
it is tenuous if not impossible. 240 For while the damaging impact of
the Socratic Method has been well established and documented,
thereby satisfying the impact prong, under Feeney arguments against it
strain to identify a discriminatory intent on the part of law school
administrators and educators. The argument in favor of the Method
touts its educational benefits, not any overt intent to discriminate, as
the reason for its implementation. 241 In addition, even in the face of
the damaging effects of the Socratic Method on its female students, the
Court's reasoning in Feeney would relegate this foreseeability to a
mere inference "that does not ripen into proof., 2
42
236. See sources cited supra note 86.
237. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278 (1979).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 279.
240. Some opponents to the intent requirement have argued that this standard creates a
right without remedy. As one opponent argues, "By forcing the victims of entrenched
discrimination in this country to establish the motives of institutional actors, either directly...
or inferentially through heightened evidentiary requirements . . . the Court has defined the
rights of these victims in such a manner as to preclude effective remedies." Samuel
Issacharoff, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection
Law, 92 YALE L.J. 328, 350 (1982).
241. Gamer, supra note 27, at 1648.
242. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 n.25.
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IX. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCRATIC METHOD: MAKING THE
ARGUMENT
While the standards put forward by Feeney dim the likelihood
of a successful equal protection claim against the Socratic Method, this
section details another strategy under the equal protection doctrine that
offers some remedy for overcoming the barrier to proving intent.
The VM decision delivers a powerful blow to state-sponsored
pedagogies that discriminate against women.243  It offers an
opportunity for redress, and aids in overcoming the rigidity of the
intent standard. The Supreme Court provided another position from
which "all forms of sexist pedagogy" may be attacked. 24 The Socratic
Method conforms to this characterization. Under the reasoning in the
VMI decision, attempts by proponents to merely assert the benefits of
the Socratic Method would falter when balanced against the
detrimental effect of this teaching style on the female law student.
In VM/, the United States brought suit against the
Commonwealth of Virginia, alleging that it violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by maintaining a
military college exclusively for men.245  Virginia argued that the
adversative model of education employed at the Virginia Military
Institute's was a unique teaching strategy that could not be maintained
if women were allowed to enroll.246 The Court ruled that excluding
women in order to offer men a unique educational opportunity was
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.
2 47
The Court reasoned, "[i]nherent differences between men and
women... remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's
opportunity., 248 The Court opposed the use of inherent differences
between men and women as a means of denying either sex an equal
opportunity. 249  Therefore, the Court applied the stringent
"exceedingly persuasive" standard in formulating its holding in
VM/.25° This standard is demanding and it requires the state to show
243. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
244. Id. at 550-51.
245. ld. at 519.
246. Id. at 524 (arguing, "VMI's school for men brought diversity to an otherwise
coeducational Virginia system, and that diversity was 'enhanced by VMI's unique method of
instruction.").
247. Id. at 519.
248. Id. at 533.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 532-33.
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that the challenged action serves an "important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. 25 1
In applying this rule to the Socratic Method, a means of
offering constitutional redress emerges, as the similarities between
VMI's adversative pedagogies and the Socratic Method are striking.
This symmetry bolsters the extension of the Court's ruling in VMI to
the sexist nature of the Socratic Method. For example, VMI's
adversative model is also referred to as the doubting model, because it
"dissects the young student and makes him aware of his limits and
capabilities . . .. , Proponents of the Socratic Method have
identified a very similar objective. Rosato identifies the pure nature of
the Socratic Method as intended by Socrates himself was to construct a
dialogue between the educator and the student.253  The goal of the
instructor was to "facilitate the student's inquiry by first exposing the
student's ignorance and then encouraging him to answer more
questions that would enable him to obtain the necessary knowledge on
his own." 254  This equation highlights just one of the similarities
between these two adversative pedagogies.
Another similarity between these two methodologies is evident
in the reliance on humiliating and denigrating tactics to further
knowledge. For example, VMI's adversative model accomplishes this
through a hierarchical or "dyke" system wherein a senior classman is
assigned to an entering classman referred to as a "rat." 255 The senior
classman is responsible for indoctrinating the "rat" or freshman into
256 thmthe stringently enforced honor code system. While the mechanics of
law school do not explicitly provide for such a hierarchy, many of its
female members have indicated a similar sense of denigration, and
humiliation in the classroom. 7  They have reported troubling
instances ranging from offensive comments by instructors and male
classmates to the humiliation of the abusive use of the Method in the
classroom.258 As the Stanford study highlighted in examining the
silencing of women law students, women fail to participate in class out
of fear or out of a general unwillingness to engage in the showmanship
251. Id. at 533.
252. Id. at 522.
253. Rosato, supra note 49, at 41.
254. Id. at 42-43.
255. VM, 518 U.S. at 522.
256. Id.
257. See supra Part IV.
258. See supra Part IV.
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called for in the Socratic Classroom, and some who begin to
participate stop because they feel uncomfortable or unwelcome.
259
The study further stated that the alienation resulting in women's
silence in the classroom was often caused by professors who ignored
or trivialized points made by women, and later gave credence to the
same ideas when expressed by men.
260
It is compelling to note that one of the pivotal moments in the
VM case occurred during oral arguments, when Paul Bender attorney
for the United States analogized the Socratic Method's adversative
model to that of VMI. He posited:
What if a State set up a State law school in
1839, all for men, because at that time only men could
be lawyers, and over 150 years it developed an
extremely adversative method of legal education, the
toughest kind of Socratic teaching, tremendous time
pressures, tremendous pressures in exams, tremendous
combativeness by the faculty, tremendous
competitiveness among the students, and developed a
reputation for that.
And then as women came into the legal
profession and started to apply to the school, to ask it to
change its admission policy, the school made a
judgment that most women really wouldn't be
comfortable in this environment, and the faculty would
have trouble cross-examining them in the same way
they cross-examine women, and other students would
have difficulty relating to them in the same competitive
way and so it is better not to let women into the school.
What we'll do is, we'll set up a new women's
law school, and it won't have the tough Socratic
Method, it will have a much warmer, a much more
embracing environment, and it won't have large classes
with a lot of pressure, it will have seminars, and it
won't have tough exams, it will have papers, and things
like that ---
259. WEISS & MELLING, supra note 45, at 1335.
260. Id. at 1336.
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(Laughter.) 261
The Courtroom erupted in laughter at the absurdity of such a
proposition. However, it was this very line of reasoning and this
analogy that compelled the Court to ultimately side with the United
States against the sexist pedagogy of the Virginia Military Institute.262
Further, it is the very types of humane approaches that Bender
proffered as an exaggeration for which numerous studies call in order
to secure the equal treatment and opportunity of women law
students.263
The Socratic Method as implemented in many state universities
becomes the equivalent of unequal access to an educational
opportunity in which women are fit to engage. 264 As the second Banks
study concluded, "[t]oday's women may have access to education, but
they do not receive an equal education., 265
Further support for the conclusion that the Socratic Method
violates equal protection is found in the Court's reasoning in VMJ,
where Virginia's main argument was based on pedagogical grounds of
segregation.266 It maintained that the segregation itself was part of its
unique pedagogy. 267  Virginia also argued that single-sex education
serves an important governmental and educational objective. 2 " In this
sense segregation was not just the physical status, meaning the absence
of women, but it was the teaching strategy. 269  The Court explicitly
struck at this sexist pedagogy by holding that it prevented women from
having access to an education in which they were fit to engage.
Thereby the Court created an avenue by which other sexist and
261. United States v. Va., 1996 U.S. Trans Lexis 9, 19-20 (1996). Judging by the oral
argument of the VMI case, we seem, unfortunately, not to have advanced far beyond Justice
Bradley in our assumptions that good lawyering requires masculine qualities. Arguing for the
United States, Paul Bender analogized VMI to a traditional Socratic Method law school with
large classes and issue spotting exams, and VWIL to an all female law school with a nurturing
teaching style and seminar papers, on the assumption, apparently shared by a majority of the
Court, that only the former would adequately prepare students. See also Mary Anne Case,
Discrimination and Inequailty Emerging Issues 'The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns:'
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law As a Quest For Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REv.
1447, 1470 n.118 (2000).
262. See Case, supra note 260, 1470 n. 118 (describing the Court's agreement with
Bender's analogy between VMI and the Socratic Method).
263. See supra Parts IV, VI.
264. United States v. Va., 518 U.S. at 515, 551 (1996).
265. BANKS 11, supra note 45, at 528.
266. VMI, 515 U.S. at 549.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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adversative pedagogies including the Socratic Method could be
attacked. As it stated,
Virginia maintains that these methodological
differences are 'justified pedagogically .... ,270
State actors controlling gates to opportunity...
may not exclude qualified individuals based on "fixed
notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and
females.
271
Equal protection principles, as applied to gender
classifications, mean State actors may not rely on
overbroad generalizations to make judgments about
people that are likely to . . . perpetuate historical
patterns of discrimination.
2 72
The Court is simultaneously putting forward the premise that
sexist pedagogy proffered by state actors will not survive
constitutional scrutiny, while also speaking to the unacceptable
interweaving of historical forms of discrimination into current
pedagogical strategies. Analogously, the Socratic Method as a
teaching tool finds its basis in sexism and exclusion, and its continued
implementation in state universities conforms to those parameters the
Court rejects in VMW.
The Court's posture in this case explicitly secures the right of
equal access in the field of education for women. It lays a solid
foundation that, if extended, can be used as an analogous argument
against the Socratic Method and all forms of sexist pedagogies to
protect against its disparate impact upon women law students.
270. Id.
271. Id.at541.
272. Id. at 541-42.
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X. CONCLUSION: A REINVENTION OF THE MASTER'S TOOLS
The Socratic Method is the primary tool for legal education in
law schools throughout this country. Based on antiquated, male-
centered pedagogy, it has served to alienate and exclude a significant
portion of the American law student body. The stifling effects of the
Socratic Method are characterized by the construction of a tyrannical,
humiliating educational experience for many law students, but with
particularly debilitating effects to female law students. The
culminating consequences of this method radiate from its central
silencing, and extend into the psychological, and ultimately extra-
curricular career enhancing opportunities for women studying law.
While it is unlikely that the arguments proffered against the
Socratic Method will be sustained, and there are many hurdles to be
overcome before it ripens into a cause for judicial review, it is my
hope to provide another lens to reshape and re-contextualize the ways
in which information is put forward to the thousands of women law
students. The call for constitutional review heightens the urgency of
reform, subjecting the Socratic Method at least to revision, and
modification. Thirty years of research calls for a new way of
conceiving of education in ways that speak to women's humanity and
not women's humiliation. A more humane approach could be
achieved by implementing the Chapman "ethic of care," which
includes using alternative methods of teaching, giving more exercises,
practice examinations, and other feedback, building better
relationships among students and faculty, and hiring more women and
minority professors.273
The Constitution provides a vehicle through which relief can
be sought, and the current case law speaks in support of this
dismantling. Justice Ginsburg, in her delivery of the Court's opinion
in VMI, poignantly calls attention to this remedy, when she says, "A
prime part of the history of our Constitution . . . is the story of the
extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once
ignored or excluded., 274 Through the equal protection doctrine, a
means for the reinvention of the hegemonic pedagogy of the Socratic
Method is available, and a remedial provision constructed in order
dismantle this final vestige of "the master's tools" from the body of
legal education.
273. See supra Part VI.
274. VM/, 518 U.S. at 557 (recounting the words of historian Richard Morris).
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